Everyday life is full of situations that game theory can describe in outline, as long as the everyday story is not forced into the wrong textbook box.
A game, in this sense, is a situation in which one person's payoff depends on what someone else does, and in which each person is trying, with limited information, to choose. The ten cases below are a silent elevator as a coordination norm, a workplace error as a social dilemma, a take-it-or-leave-it split as an ultimatum, a last slice as a volunteer's dilemma, a shared office fridge as a commons, a stale yellow light as a game of chicken, a social-media like as a cheap signal, a group choosing a film as coordination with conflicting favorites, a shared kitchen or connection as a public good, and a night of "one more episode" as a problem of time and self-control, which sits next to game theory rather than inside a single matrix. This article is not a guide to outsmarting anyone.
Key Facts
| Situation | Useful idea | What not to claim | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Silence in a crowded elevator | Coordination on a shared norm, and a focal way of behaving once the norm exists | That every quiet lift is a formal experiment |
| 2 | Whether to report a mistake at work | A social dilemma: the group is better off if errors surface, each person may prefer not to be the one who speaks | A complete map onto the classic two-person prisoner's dilemma |
| 3 | A take-it-or-leave-it split of a bill or a leftover amount | The ultimatum game: an offer can be rejected, and then both get nothing | That a second text message is literally this game |
| 4 | Who takes, or leaves, the last slice | The volunteer's dilemma: someone may have to forgo a private gain for a shared norm to hold | A moral lecture about appetite |
| 5 | A shared office fridge or coffee tin | The tragedy of the commons: a depletable shared resource and a temptation to take more than a share | That jumping a queue is the same formal game |
| 6 | Two drivers approaching a stale yellow light | Chicken, or hawk-dove: each prefers the other to yield | Driving advice |
| 7 | A public "like" on a social platform | Signaling, often cheap signaling, which is why the signal can be noisy | That a like is a currency in the strict economic sense |
| 8 | Friends choosing a film when they want different films | Coordination with conflicting preferences, sometimes still taught under an older textbook name | That the traditional name is a fact about gender |
| 9 | A shared connection, kitchen, or other non-rival convenience | A public-goods problem: people can enjoy a contribution they did not make | A landlord-and-tenant legal opinion |
| 10 | "One more episode" late at night | Present bias and inconsistent plans over time, adjacent to sequential choice | That a person is literally two players at a table |
1. A Quiet Elevator as a Shared Script
People who do not know one another often fall silent in a crowded elevator, look at the door or the floor numbers, and wait [1]. Game theory would describe this, at a high level, as coordination on a norm: once "we do not talk here" is the expected move, talking becomes a little costly, and staying quiet is a way of not being the person who broke the script. Thomas Schelling's idea of a focal point helps explain why a mute, downward glance can feel like the obvious action even though no one voted on it [1].
The unexpected fact is how little conversation is required to maintain the rule. A norm can be an equilibrium without being a law [1]. This article will not treat every silent lift as a laboratory, and it will not advise anyone to break the silence as an experiment. The careful fact is a recognizable coordination problem, a shared expectation, and a reminder that everyday politeness is already full of games in the formal sense. If everyone tried to start a conversation, the cabin would be a different game.
A quiet elevator is not a riddle. It is a small, repeated agreement that no one quite remembers making.
2. A Workplace Error, and a Social Dilemma
If a small error at work is more likely to be fixed when someone names it, the group is better off when people speak, and each person may still prefer that the speaker be someone else [2]. That structure is a social dilemma. The classic prisoner's dilemma is a clean two-person version in which each has a dominant incentive to withhold cooperation even though both would be better off cooperating. A real office is messier: reputations, repeated encounters, and formal reporting rules all change the payoffs [2].
The unexpected fact is that the popular label, "prisoner's dilemma," is sometimes too tight for the situation it is asked to cover, and still useful as a warning [2]. This article will not tell anyone whether to report a particular mistake, and it will not offer a tactic for avoiding blame. The careful fact is a conflict between a private cost and a shared benefit, which is why organizations invent anonymous channels, blameless post-mortems, and other attempts to change the game. If the payoffs stay as they were, silence can be individually rational and collectively expensive.
A dilemma is a structure, not a verdict on character. Changing the structure is the usual institutional response.
3. A Take-It-or-Leave-It Offer
In the ultimatum game, one person proposes a split of a sum, and the other can accept, in which case the split happens, or reject, in which case both get nothing [3]. Laboratories have found, repeatedly, that many responders will reject a split they regard as too unfair, even at a cost to themselves, and that many proposers, anticipating that, do not offer the smallest possible crumb. The game is a better match for a take-it-or-leave-it split of a bill, a leftover cash amount, or a one-time sale than it is for a second text message in a courtship, a comparison some popular lists have tried to force [3].
Related: Top 10 Most Bizarre Phobias: Strange Fears That Exist
The unexpected fact is that "rational" in the narrow sense of grabbing any positive amount is not what people always do, and that this has been one of the results that pushed economics toward experiments [3]. This article will not treat a dating habit as a formal ultimatum, and it will not advise anyone on how to make a hard bargain. The careful fact is a well-studied, two-move game, a robust pattern of rejected low offers, and a reminder that fairness, or at least a taste for not being treated as a residual, can be part of the payoff. A leftover amount on a table is enough of a laboratory.
An ultimatum is a structure with a veto. It is not a personality type, and it is not a texting rule.
4. The Last Slice, and a Volunteer
When a last slice sits on a plate, someone may want it, and someone may also want the group not to look greedy, and the two wants may not live in the same person [4]. The volunteer's dilemma describes a class of situations in which a public benefit appears if at least one person pays a private cost, and in which each would prefer that another person be the volunteer. Leaving the last slice, or being the one who says "you take it," can be read in that light, as can more serious cases such as who calls for help [4].
The unexpected fact is that a comic body of manners and a formal dilemma can have the same shape [4]. This article will not moralize about appetite, and it will not turn a party into a worksheet. The careful fact is a named game, a private cost, a shared benefit, and a risk that everyone waits and the benefit never arrives. In a small group of friends, repetition and reputation usually solve the problem. In a larger, anonymous group, they may not.
A last slice is a small volunteer problem. The interesting part is not the slice. It is the waiting.
5. A Shared Fridge as a Little Commons
A shared office fridge, a tin of coffee, or a box of tea can be used up faster than it is replaced if each person takes a little more than a share and leaves the restocking to someone else [5]. That is a small, everyday version of the tragedy of the commons: a depletable resource, open enough that no one person has a full incentive to conserve it, and a group that is worse off if everyone thinks that way. The classic image is a pasture. The office fridge is a less scenic pasture [5].
The unexpected fact is that "cutting in line," which some popular lists use as their commons example, is usually a different game, a queue and a norm, not a depletable stock [5]. This article will not treat a queue-jumper and a pasture as the same formal object, and it will not offer a surveillance plan for a kitchen. The careful fact is a depletable shared good, a temptation to overuse, and a set of ordinary fixes, such as a label, a fund, or a rule, that try to change the incentives. Garrett Hardin's famous essay has a disputed history and a political afterlife; the narrow incentive problem does not depend on accepting every conclusion he later drew.
Related: Top 10 Oldest Buildings in the World
A commons is a stock that can be overused. A fridge can be that stock, which is already an unglamorous enough lesson.
6. A Stale Yellow, and Who Yields
Two drivers approaching an intersection as the light turns yellow can each prefer to go if the other slows, and each prefers not to meet in the middle [6]. That payoff pattern is the game of chicken, also discussed as hawk-dove: two parties, a conflict, and a worse outcome if neither yields. It is a description of incentives, not a driving lesson, and it is not a reason to treat a public road as a contest [6].
The unexpected fact is how quickly a formal game appears in a daily commute, and how little that appearance should be taken as advice [6]. This article will not tell anyone when to brake, and it will not glamorize "winning" a light. The careful fact is a two-player structure with a mutually bad crash outcome, which is why traffic law, signal timing, and habit exist: they try to take the game away and replace it with a rule. When the rule is clear, the interesting game shrinks. When the light is stale and the habit is assertive, the game returns.
Chicken is a name for a payoff table. On a road, the serious version of the bad cell is an accident, which is why this list will not treat the table as a sport.
7. A Like Is Often a Cheap Signal
In a signaling game, one party has information, or a quality, that another would like to know, and a signal is useful when it is hard enough to fake [7]. A public "like," a heart, or a quick reaction on a social platform is often a cheap signal: it costs almost nothing, so it can be sent for many reasons, including habit, and it may tell a viewer less than a more costly act would tell. That does not make the like meaningless. It makes it noisy [7].
The unexpected fact is that calling likes a "currency" oversells their discipline as money and undersells their discipline as signals [7]. This article will not offer a growth tactic, and it will not treat a platform as a workplace. The careful fact is a cheap, visible, low-cost sign, a noisy relationship to approval or attention, and a reminder from signaling theory that a costless badge is easy to inflate. When everyone can send the same mark, the mark carries less news. People then look for costlier signs, which is how the next fashion in displays gets started.
Related: 10 Sikh Gurus: The Pillars of Sikhism Who Shaped Faith, Equality, Courage, and Humanity
A like can be a courtesy, a habit, or a weak vote. Game theory's contribution is to ask what it could possibly prove, given how little it costs.
8. Two Films, and a Coordination Problem
When two people want to spend the evening together and want different films, they have a coordination problem with conflicting favorites [8]. Each prefers to be together rather than apart, and each has a preferred title. The textbook version of this game has often been taught under a dated, gendered name, "battle of the sexes," or under the more neutral "Bach or Stravinsky." The structure matters more than the name: there are two coordinated outcomes, and a fight about which one to pick [8].
The unexpected fact is that the hard part is not finding a film. It is agreeing, without a coin, which of two acceptable evenings to have [8]. This article will not treat the older name as a fact about men and women, and it will not offer a bargaining script. The careful fact is a standard coordination game with asymmetric preferences, a pair of equilibria, and a everyday setting in which taking turns, or trading the next choice, is a way of playing the game more than once. A single evening can look like a stubborn argument. A series of evenings can look like a policy.
A conflict of favorites is still a desire to coordinate. The game begins with that shared desire, not with the conflict.
9. A Shared Convenience as a Public Good
A shared wireless connection, a clean kitchen, or a communal pot of coffee can be enjoyed by people who did not contribute to keeping it going [9]. In the public-goods game, a benefit is at least partly non-rival and hard to withhold from a non-contributor, so the temptation is to free-ride while hoping others will still provide the good. Everyday roommates and officemates play a rough version of this game whenever someone is asked to pay, to clean, or to call the provider [9].
The unexpected fact is how often a quarrel about "fairness" is a public-goods problem that has not been given a rule [9]. This article will not adjudicate a household bill, and it will not treat a legal tenancy as a classroom exercise. The careful fact is a standard incentive problem, a benefit that can be consumed without paying, and a set of ordinary solutions: splitting a cost, rotating a chore, or excluding non-contributors when that is possible. If exclusion is impossible, the group has to solve the contribution problem some other way, or live with a thinner good.
Related: Top 10 Tallest Buildings in the World
A public good is not "the public sector." It is a type of benefit. A shared connection can be that type, which is why the bill becomes a game.
10. One More Episode, and a Later Self
A person who plans to watch one episode and then watches four is not usually playing a game against another person [10]. The closer ideas come from intertemporal choice: present bias, inconsistent discounting, and a plan made at 8 p.m. that is not the plan followed at 11. Popular accounts sometimes call this a game against a future self. That metaphor is useful only if it is not taken as a literal two-player table [10].
The unexpected fact is that this is the item on the list that sits beside game theory rather than inside a classic matrix, and that the honest placement is already interesting [10]. This article will not offer a self-help regimen, and it will not treat a streaming library as a trap by design without evidence for a particular product. The careful fact is a well-studied tension between a present preference and a longer plan, a sequential series of choices, and a reminder that "rationality" over time is a different problem from "rationality" in a one-shot game. A later self can be the person who wanted to sleep. A present self can be the person who clicked next.
A night of episodes is a planning problem. It becomes a "game" only in a loose, interior sense, which is why this list puts it last and labels the looseness.
Conclusion
The ten situations above are a silent elevator, a workplace error, a take-it-or-leave-it split, a last slice, a shared fridge, a stale yellow light, a cheap like, a disputed film, a shared connection, and a night that runs past its plan. Some of those are standard games. One is a neighboring problem of time. A popular list that maps every habit onto the first textbook title it can find will, sooner or later, map it wrongly.
Game theory helps when the payoffs and the dependence on other people are real. It does not help when it is used as a style of advice for getting the better of a friend, a colleague, or a driver, and this article has not tried to be that style of advice.
- ^ [1] Introductory accounts of coordination games and of Schelling's focal points, applied cautiously to everyday norms such as silence in a crowded elevator. Britannica: game theory Britannica: Thomas Schelling
- ^ [2] Overviews of the prisoner's dilemma and of wider social dilemmas, including the caution that a real workplace is a repeated, institutional setting, not a single two-person matrix. Britannica: prisoner's dilemma Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: prisoner's dilemma
- ^ [3] Experimental and textbook accounts of the ultimatum game, including rejected low offers, without forcing a courtship habit into the formal game. Britannica: game theory Wikipedia: ultimatum game
- ^ [4] Accounts of the volunteer's dilemma as a public benefit that requires at least one person to pay a private cost. Wikipedia: volunteer's dilemma Britannica: game theory
- ^ [5] Discussions of the tragedy of the commons as a depletable shared resource, with a shared fridge as a small example and a queue-jump treated as a different problem. Britannica: tragedy of the commons Britannica: game theory
- ^ [6] Textbook accounts of the game of chicken, or hawk-dove, as a conflict in which mutual aggression is the worst cell, applied only as a description of incentives at a stale yellow light, not as driving advice. Britannica: game theory Wikipedia: game of chicken
- ^ [7] Accounts of signaling games, including the difference between costly and cheap signals, applied to low-cost public reactions on social platforms. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: game theory Britannica: game theory
- ^ [8] Accounts of coordination games with conflicting preferences, including the older textbook name and a more neutral "Bach or Stravinsky" framing. Britannica: game theory Wikipedia: battle of the sexes (game theory)
- ^ [9] Introductory accounts of public-goods games and of free-riding on a benefit that is hard to withhold from non-contributors. Britannica: public good Britannica: game theory
- ^ [10] Discussions of present bias and inconsistent plans over time, treated as intertemporal choice adjacent to game theory rather than as a literal two-player game. Britannica: decision theory Britannica: game theory
Discussion
Log in with